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TO BAR OR NOT TO BAR: TITLE I OF THE ADA
AND AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE OF A
PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO SATISFY JOB
PREREQUISITES
KATHRYN JOHNSON-MONFORT*
ABSTRACT
Through enactment of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, Congress unequivocally resolved to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability in the workplace. However,
distortions have since created loopholes through which disabilitybased employment discrimination may freely slip. An enforcement
regulation promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) enables such circumvention of the ADA by
creating an additional prima facie requirement: a plaintiff must
not only be able to perform the essential functions of the position
as required by the statute, but must also satisfy all job-related requirements of the position as demanded by the EEOC’s 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(m). Thus, in cases where a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy job
prerequisites is discovered only after the alleged discrimination,
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(m) still permits (indeed, requires) dismissal. In
light of the Supreme Court’s rejection of after-acquired evidence as
a bar to employment discrimination claims in other contexts, action
must be taken to eradicate this ADA escape clause. Although the
EEOC advocates abandoning its regulation in favor of the ADA’s less
stringent standard in certain circumstances, its proposed method
usurps the applicable burden-shifting framework and sets the stage
for prima facie overload on the plaintiff.
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This Note proposes a more straightforward alternative approach: legislative action should be taken to enable reversion to the
ADA’s singular essential functions standard in instances where a
plaintiff’s failure to satisfy job-related requirements (1) is discovered only after the alleged discriminatory employment action, and
(2) constitutes the sole flaw in the prima facie case.
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INTRODUCTION
Our nation holds out as its fundamental premise that “all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness.”1 President George H.W. Bush echoed
this principle in his speech at the July 1990 signing ceremony for
the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), as he acknowledged the
prejudice that historically blocked the disabled population’s access to this guarantee: “[w]ith today’s signing of the landmark
[ADA], every man, woman, and child with a disability can now
pass through once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality,
independence, and freedom.”2 As President Bush alluded, this basic
constitutional ethic has historically been an unfulfilled promise
for disabled Americans, rather than a guaranteed reality.3 Despite
the United States’ foundational declaration of equality across all
mankind, human history tells a different, darker story, replete with
exclusion and marginalization.4 The enactment of the ADA in 1990
was a momentous move to change this with respect to disabled
Americans, an express attempt to “remove the physical barriers
we have created and the social barriers that we have accepted.”5
Congress intended the ADA to serve as “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”6 Congressional findings
therein recognize the historical exclusion of disabled persons from

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
George H.W. Bush, President, United States, Remarks on the Signing of
the American with Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990) (available at https://miller
center.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-26-1990-remarks-signing
-americans-disabilities-act [https://perma.cc/HFV6-LHDX]).
3 Id.; see Rachel Heather Hinckley, Note, Evading Promises: The Promise of
Equality Under U.S. Disability Law and How the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Can Help, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.
185, 191 (2010).
4 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing
the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1359 (1993).
5 Bush, supra note 2.
6 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b) (West 2009);
see also Lisa Schlesinger, The Social Model’s Case for Inclusion: “Motivating
Factor” and “But For” Standards of Proof Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Impact of the Social Model of Disability on Employees with Disabilities, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2116 (2014).
1
2
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mainstream society, noting they remain disadvantaged as a group
due to longstanding segregation and purposeful, forced political
powerlessness.7 To address our society’s pervasive problem of
continued discrimination on the basis of disability and prohibit such
activity under federal law,8 the ADA contains five titles: Employment (Title I), Public Services (Title II), Public Accommodations
(Title III), Telecommunications (Title IV), and Miscellaneous Provisions (Title V).9
Title I, the focus of this Note, was modeled after Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196410 and undertakes to promote equal
employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities by prohibiting employment discrimination on that basis.11 However, implementation of the ADA has since presented loopholes through
which disability discrimination may slip unhindered, or at least
unremedied.12 Specifically, a victim of egregious discrimination
suing under the ADA may find their suit defeated with zero consideration of the employer-defendant’s alleged discriminatory
action, if the defendant manages to uncover, post hoc, evidence of
the plaintiff’s failure to fulfill job-related requirements.13 While the
Supreme Court held that “after-acquired” evidence could only limit
damages and not bar all relief in employment discrimination suits
filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),14
federal circuits currently disagree as to whether it may entirely
defeat, on prima facie grounds, a suit filed under the ADA.15

§ 12101(a).
8 Id.
9 ADA NAT’L NETWORK, What is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)?,
https://adata.org/learn-about-ada [https://perma.cc/4U57-BRQA] (last updated
July 2021).
10 Jamie L. Ireland & Richard Bales, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Its Prohibition of Employment Discrimination, 28 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 183, 188 (2008).
11 Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101(a)(3), (8).
12 See Melissa Hart, Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The Chilling Effects of
“After-Acquired Evidence”, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 401, 401–02.
13 Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding
that after-acquired evidence of an employee’s lack of qualification permits summary judgement for employer-defendant without consideration of “whether there
was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s discharge.”).
14 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362–63 (1995).
15 Compare Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1131, with Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410
F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that after-acquired evidence of an employee’s lack of qualification merely limits potentially recoverable damages).
7
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With regard to the “qualified individual” element of an ADA
prima facie suit, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) enforcement standard requires that a plaintiff satisfy jobrelated requirements.16 However, under the less stringent definition in the ADA itself, a plaintiff must only be able to perform
the “essential functions” of the position in order to be qualified.17
So, in cases where a plaintiff fails to satisfy job prerequisites (and
this failure is discovered after the alleged discrimination), application of the ADA essential functions standard would potentially
allow the suit to continue unbarred, where the more stringent
EEOC regulation would operate to enable dismissal.18
Part I will provide a brief overview of the legal history of
disability in the United States, with a focus on the enactment of
the ADA and its underlying policy goals.19 Part II will examine
the ADA in practice by reviewing the burden-shifting framework
of an ADA suit, the “qualified individual” limitation (and corresponding essential functions standard), and the EEOC’s distinct
enforcement standard for the same.20 Part III will review the
Supreme Court’s decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. and discuss the circuit disagreement over whether
after-acquired evidence of an employee’s lack of job qualification
is fatal to an employee’s ability to establish a prima facie case
under the ADA (in other words, whether to extend McKennon’s
ADEA reasoning to ADA cases).21 Part IV argues McKennon should
apply to ADA cases, but rejects the EEOC’s proffered mechanism,
which posits that reversion to the essential functions standard
should depend on a relevance determination made prematurely at
the prima facie stage;22 according to the EEOC, reversion is only
proper where the qualifications at issue were not relevant to the
defendant’s challenged action.23 Part IV instead proposes the
alternative “sole glitch” method, arguing legislative action should be

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2020).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 2009).
18 See, e.g., Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1130.
19 See infra Part I.
20 See infra Part II; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
21 See infra Part III.
22 See infra Part IV.
23 Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant and in Favor of Reversal at 23–24, Anthony
v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-15662) [hereinafter
Brief of the EEOC].
16
17
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taken to enable reversion of the qualified individual inquiry to
the ADA’s less stringent essential functions standard in instances
where a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy job-related requirements (1) is
discovered only after the alleged discriminatory employment action,
and (2) constitutes the sole flaw in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.24
I.DISABILITY IN AMERICAN LAW
The legal sphere has long been an environment hostile to
the disabled community,25 and Western society’s general virulence
toward people with disabilities stretches back into history.26 Sovereign policies historically reflected inimical cultural attitudes of
fear and derision, permitting (and empowering) targeted prejudice.27 During the American colonial period, the colonies went so
far as to deport disabled individuals on the basis of their supposed
inability to succeed on the frontier.28 Society thus used various
tools to exclude individuals with disabilities from the mainstream,
later including institutional homes and sheer (legal) discrimination.29 So, stigmatized as inferior and less than human, the disabled population endured continual intolerance as civilization set
them apart and below.30 Indeed, thanks to abundant documentation in scholarly literature, “[t]he pervasiveness and perniciousness” of disability-based discrimination is beyond question.31
“Rehabilitation” in lieu of sheer rejection began to take
shape in America during the nineteenth century, as states established various rehabilitative programs with the assistance and
sponsorship of charitable organizations such as the Salvation
Army and the Red Cross.32 Most of these focused on vocational

See infra Part IV.
See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 192; Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1359–60.
26 Barbara P. Ianacone, Historical Overview: From Charity to Rights, 50 TEMP.
L.Q. 953, 953 nn.2–3 (1977).
27 See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 192.
28 Anne E. Beaumont, Note, This Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial Estoppel
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1529, 1536 (1996).
29 See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 191; Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1343.
30 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1342–43.
31 Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 415 (1997).
32 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1361.
24
25
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rehabilitation, which trained individuals with disabilities in workrelated skills with the goal of facilitating entry into the workforce.33
The Industrial Revolution and subsequent rise in workers’ compensation laws furthered this productivity-focused model in the
early twentieth century.34 However, capitalist society’s fixation
on production and generating maximum yields predictably gave
rise to animosity toward disabled workers, who were prejudicially
viewed as more inefficient.35 The simultaneous popularity of Social
Darwinism manipulated modern theories of natural selection to
justify this animus.36
Thus, despite implementation of vocational rehabilitation
programs, social antipathy toward individuals with disabilities remained high in the early twentieth century.37 Government programs to aid disabled military veterans following World War I38
eventually led to Woodrow Wilson signing the first federal civilian
vocational rehabilitation act in 1920, which encompassed “congenital” disabilities.39 Subsequent legislation focused federal disability
policy on welfare benefits,40 and it was not until the 1960s that
disability began to emerge as a civil rights issue.41

See id.
See id. at 1362, 1366.
35 See id. at 1368 n.121 (“The pervasiveness of the belief that people who
are unable to produce within the capitalist system weaken the nation cannot
be overstated.”).
36 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1537; Ianacone, supra note 26, at 954
n.10 (“After Darwin’s publication of THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES in 1859, his theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest were distorted to justify
contempt of the economically, physically, and mentally disadvantaged.”).
37 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1537.
38 See id.
39 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1364–65. Criticism of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920 centers on its prejudice, both in limiting rehabilitation
assistance to individuals with disabilities deemed “curable” and in viewing
the services it provided as “charitable” rather than based in civil rights. Id. at
1365–66.
40 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1,
10–11 (2004) (“With the creation of the Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD) program in 1950 and the Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) program in 1956 ... welfare benefits became the central component of
federal disability policy.”).
41 See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 191–92.
33
34
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The United States government largely declined to recognize
individuals with disabilities as equally deserving of civil rights,
protections, and opportunities until the second half of the twentieth
century.42 The impetus for change was the Civil Rights movement,
which brought issues of inequality and prejudice to the forefront
of public consciousness.43 Confronted with social conflict on all
sides,44 societal perspective began to change and gradually granted
prevalence to the view that all Americans were entitled to equal
“access to public life.”45 Americans with disabilities simultaneously began to engage in activism, demanding the equal protection and social equality historically denied them.46 This advocacy
became what is known as the disability rights movement, characterized by a new school of thought, “that it is society’s myths,
fears, and stereotypes that most make being disabled difficult.”47
On the civil liberties front, the disability rights movement remained
less visible than its counterparts,48 due in part to the ubiquity of its
community.49 Nonetheless, the aftershock of the 1960s was widespread; the public had come to view “equal access to society as a
civil right, and the federal government as more than a passive
player in enforcing that right.”50
Congress echoed this change in perspective with legislation
seeking to protect the rights of African Americans, particularly
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), which protected racial and
ethnic minorities from discrimination in employment, education,
and public accommodations.51 The disability rights movement saw

See id.; Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1343.
See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 191–92; see also Drimmer, supra note 4,
at 1375–76.
44 Beyond the Civil Rights movement, the nation was also exposed to the
feminist movement and the student antiwar movement. See Drimmer, supra
note 4, at 1375–76.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 5 (1994).
48 See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 192.
49 See SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 126. Because it “spanned a splintered universe” of hundreds of different groups, the movement struggled to agree on immediate issues and objectives and occasionally dealt with direct in-house conflict. Id.
50 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1375–76.
51 See id. Other legislation included the Voting Rights Act of 1965, “which
guaranteed access to political participation[,] and the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
which guaranteed access to housing.” Id. at 1376.
42
43
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similar potential52 and, harnessing this momentum, formed activist
groups at local levels.53 Congress responded with legislation like
the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (ABA), which recognized the
right of the disabled population to have access to public buildings.54
However, the ABA applied to only federal government buildings
and failed to actually recognize the existence of any form of disability discrimination.55 Moreover, despite implicitly acknowledging
that society tended to exclude people with disabilities via the construction of public facilities,56 the ABA did not include any enforcement provisions.57 So, while the ABA was not an insignificant
step toward equality and guaranteeing access,58 its actual impact
was minimal.59
Congress continued to take gradual steps into the 1970s,
including enactment of the Education of the Handicapped Act,60
but disability rights remained on a separate table from civil
rights until the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA),61 which was the
first federal law to prohibit discrimination against people with
disabilities.62 The RA did so only subtly, holding out as its purpose the creation of national employment-focused rehabilitation
programs for disabled Americans.63 However, embedded in the
RA was Section 504, the civil liberty nucleus which prohibited

See id.; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 41 (analogizing the 1962 integration of the University of Mississippi with the concurrent attendance of a
quadriplegic student at the University of California at Berkeley).
53 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1376.
54 See id. at 1377–78.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 By recognizing that individuals with disabilities have the right to enter
public buildings, the ABA both acknowledged the historical oversight in this
regard and legitimized the federal government’s responsibility to guarantee
this access. See id.
59 The compliance of federal agencies was voluntary and sporadic due to
the lack of enforcement provisions. See id. at 1378.
60 See Melanie D. Winegar, Note, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1267, 1300 (2006).
61 See id.
62 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1381.
63 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1539.
52
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discrimination against “otherwise qualified individuals” on the
basis of disability in federally funded programs and activities.64
On its face, Section 504 constituted a major policy shift by
elevating disability rights as civil rights, deserving of constitutional protection instead of solely financial assistance or rehabilitation.65 Notably, the wording of Section 504 directly corresponds
with Title VI of the CRA;66 enforcement also fell to the EEOC,
the agency responsible for enforcing civil rights laws, including the
CRA.67 Moreover, the new RA implicitly acknowledged prejudice
toward disability as the underlying issue.68 However, Section
504 was “little-noticed and unsought-after” during the legislative
process.69 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) even stalled the final regulations implementing section
504 until compelled to approve them by a twenty-five-day sit-in
at its San Francisco office.70 This standoff served as a beacon for
unified political activism by the disability rights movement in
the United States,71 calling national attention to its conviction
and power.72
After Section 504, more expansive legislation soon came
to pass.73 Beginning in 1975 with what was initially known as
the “Education for All Handicapped Children Act,”74 Congress

See id.; Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1976) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794(a)).
65 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1539.
66 See Winegar, supra note 60, at 1300–01.
67 See id.
68 See Drimmer, supra note 4, at 1384 (stating the RA “helps to counter
the discrimination and prejudice that has dominated society’s treatment of
disability.”).
69 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1539; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at
65 (“Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was no more than a legislative afterthought.”).
70 See SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 66–69.
71 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1539–40 (describing the sit-in as “one
of the first instances” of such large-scale action by people with disabilities).
72 See SHAPIRO, supra note 47, at 66–68 (describing the sit-in as the “political coming of age of the disability rights movement”).
73 See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1540.
74 Pub. L. No. 94-142, § (1), 89 Stat. 773, 775 (1975) (guaranteeing public
education to children with disabilities).
64
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continued to incorporate disability rights as civil rights.75 This included creating various federal programs geared toward developing
employment opportunities, as well as amending existing legislation.76 Despite these developments, it was not until nearly two
decades later that the government addressed disability discrimination on a more comprehensive scale.77
Limited employment opportunities have historically been
available to people with disabilities due to “inadequate education
and training programs, limited access to public transportation, and
employer misconceptions about ... safety and reliability.”78 Thus,
the employed disabled population has traditionally been relegated
to menial positions pursuant to society’s prejudiced equation of disability with inferiority.79 The RA was a crucial step in acknowledging this animus in the context of employment and helped pave
the way forward to true equal participation in society by elevating
disability rights to civil liberty protection.80 Nonetheless, the RA
“suffered from a major omission” in its scope:81 it prohibited discrimination against individuals with disabilities throughout the
federal government (and various federally funded organizations),82
but did not apply to the private sector.83 Accordingly, the RA left
private sector employees with disabilities unprotected.84
This omission was brought to the attention of the executive
branch in the 1980s, at which point President Reagan appointed
the National Council of the Handicapped to advocate for policies
benefiting the disabled community.85 In 1986, the Council called

See Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1540 (“In 1986, the Air Carrier Access
Act guaranteed access to commercial airline transportation for people with
disabilities ....”).
76 See id.
77 See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 193; Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1540.
78 See Ianacone, supra note 26, at 959.
79 See id.
80 See Winegar, supra note 60, at 1269.
81 Id.
82 See Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1976) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794(a)); Beaumont, supra note 28, at 1539.
83 See Winegar, supra note 60, at 1269.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 1269–70. The Council became an independent federal agency in
1984 after President Reagan signed the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1984.
75
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for the enactment of a comprehensive equal opportunity law applying to people with disabilities, prefacing the initial drafts of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1988.86 The ADA eventually passed Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support87
and was signed into law on July 26, 1990, by President George H.W.
Bush, who proclaimed his pride in how the ADA would finally allow disabled individuals to “blend fully and equally into the rich
mosaic of the American mainstream.”88
The ADA prohibits covered employers from “discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” with regard to various employment matters, like hiring, compensation,
and promotion.89 ADA coverage extends to employers with fifteen or more employees,90 thus reaching further than the RA and
prohibiting disability discrimination in the private as well as the
public sector.91 Under the ADA, employers cannot employ criteria
or job-related standards that screen out (or tend to screen out)
individuals based on disabilities, unless the test is both related to
the specific position and consistent with business necessity.92
Moreover, employers are required to make reasonable accommodations for otherwise qualified individuals, unless doing so would
result in an undue hardship on the employer.93 The statute clarifies that reasonable accommodations encompass measures like
facility accessibility and job restructuring;94 undue hardship is a
holistic inquiry, satisfied only when the proposed accommodation
would impose significant difficulty or expense on the employer.95
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) expanded
the ADA’s definition of disability in response to case law narrowly

See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, National Council on Disability celebrates 40
years of advancing federal disability policy (Nov. 6, 2018), https://ncd.gov/news
room/2018/NCD-celebrates-40-years [https://perma.cc/4UAQ-EFXS].
86 See Winegar, supra note 60, at 1270.
87 See id. at 1270–71. In 1990, the final version was passed by 377 to 28 in
the House on July 12 and by 91 to 6 in the Senate on July 13. Id.
88 Bush, supra note 2.
89 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2009).
90 Id. § 12111(5)(A).
91 See Hinckley, supra note 3, at 187.
92 § 12112 (b)(6).
93 Id. § 12112 (b)(5).
94 Id. § 12111(9).
95 Id. § 12111(10).
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construing and constraining the statute’s reach.96 The ADAAA
represented permanence, enabling broader protection and “solidifying the ADA’s status alongside [the CRA] as a core civil rights
law.”97 This process of setting the ADA on par with the CRA can
be traced to the ADA itself, as Congress’s findings explicitly acknowledge both the contemptible history and ongoing practice of
disability-based discrimination.98 Indeed, the ADA’s purpose statement is unequivocal; Congress intended “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”99
In the employment context, Title I of the ADA is modeled
after Title VII of the CRA100 to both prevent discrimination
against and increase the opportunities available to individuals
with disabilities.101 The ADA has seen significant progress in
this regard, although some argue the need for protection against
disability-based employment discrimination remains acute.102 With
regard to enforcement, Congress authorized the EEOC to promulgate regulations to implement Title I.103 Employees who bring
employment discrimination suits may be entitled to various
forms of legal relief, including punitive and compensatory damages.104 However, a plaintiff suing under Title I of the ADA carries a heavier burden than mere allegation.105

See generally Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12113).
97 Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying Universality under the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (2015).
98 § 12101(a).
99 Id. § 12101(b)(1).
100 See Ireland & Bales, supra note 10, at 188.
101 § 12101(a)(8).
102 “Prior to the ADA, sixty-six percent of disabled individuals of working
age did not have a job but wanted to work. As of the twentieth anniversary of
the ADA, forty-one percent of disabled individuals still report difficulty finding or keeping a job.” Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 2116. See also Winegar,
supra note 60, at 1267–68.
103 See Ireland & Bales, supra note 10, at 189.
104 See id. at 188; David D. Kadue & William J. Dritsas, When What You
Didn’t Know Can Help You—Employer’s Use of After-Acquired Evidence of
Employee Misconduct to Defend Wrongful Discharge Claims, 27 BEVERLY
HILLS BAR ASS’N J. 117, 126 (1993).
105 See Douglas A. Blair, Employees Suffering from Bipolar Disorder or Clinical
Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347, 1362 (1999).
96
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II.THE ADA PLAINTIFF
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court
set forth a burden-shifting analysis governing the standard of proof
in cases filed under Title VII of the CRA.106 This analysis (known
as the McDonnell Douglas framework) requires the complainant
carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the statute.107 After the plaintiff achieves
this, a presumption of unlawful discrimination exists;108 the
burden then shifts to the defendant-employer “to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its] actions.”109 That is,
the employer must produce sufficient evidence that would support a finding that the employment action was not caused by unlawful discrimination.110 If the employer successfully meets this
burden of production and rebuts the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the plaintiff resumes the ultimate burden of proof and persuasion.111
Although the McDonnell Douglas framework originated in
the context of employment discrimination claims filed under
Title VII of the CRA, courts began applying it to other antidiscrimination statutes, including the ADA112 (specifically in instances where the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory
intent).113 Despite some debate over the framework’s analytical
value, it remains consistently relied upon by federal district courts
at the pretrial motion stage.114 Consequently, under the framework,
an ADA plaintiff must satisfy the elements of a prima facie case
in order to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.115
If the court finds the plaintiff failed to do so, then summary judgment may be granted without the employer being required to

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973).
107 Id. at 802.
108 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
109 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
110 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 507.
111 Id.
112 See Blair, supra note 105, at 1362 n.83; see, e.g., Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
113 Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 2005).
114 See Travis, supra note 97, at 1740.
115 Rooney, 410 F.3d at 380–81.
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formulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.116 The ADA-specific prima facie requirements are
somewhat jurisdiction-dependent, but a plaintiff will generally
need to establish that they: (1) are “disabled” under the definition
of the statute; (2) are a “qualified individual”; and (3) suffered discrimination (in the form of adverse employment action) on the
basis of their disability.117
The ADA defines “disability” as either an impairment
that substantially limits one or more of an individual’s life activities, a record of such an impairment, or having been regarded as
having such an impairment (be it actual or merely perceived).118
With regard to being a “qualified individual,” the requirements
become more convoluted.119 The ADA explicitly defines a qualified individual as one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position.”120 The statute then clarifies that determining the essential functions of a particular position involves considering the
employer’s judgment, like the official description of the position.121
This essential functions component was implemented to focus the
reasonable accommodation determination on the important aspects of the position.122
However, the EEOC subsequently promulgated a regulation
expanding the ADA’s foundational, straightforward “qualified”
definition.123 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) states that a disabled individual
is only qualified under the ADA if they “satisf[y] the requisite skill,
experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position ... and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.”124
Thus, the EEOC set forth a new two-step inquiry for the ADA
qualified individual element: courts first determine whether the
individual satisfied the prerequisites of the job, and second consider whether the individual can perform the essential functions

Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020).
See Blair, supra note 105, at 1362.
118 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12102(1), (3) (West 2009).
119 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
120 § 12111(8).
121 Id.
122 See Travis, supra note 97, at 1738.
123 Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2020).
124 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2020).
116
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of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.125 Because
Congress authorized the EEOC to promulgate “legislative regulations” for Title I of the ADA, courts defer to the agency’s regulations so long as they are reasonable.126 So, a plaintiff’s inability
to satisfy either prong of the EEOC two-step qualified individual
inquiry means a failure to establish a prima facie case.127
Some scholars argue that post-ADAAA case law demonstrates that the qualification inquiry has become a “gate-keeping
mechanism to avoid the difficult questions of accommodation and
full recognition of disability civil rights.”128 Although the ADAAA
modified and expanded the definition of disability,129 it left the
qualified individual element untouched.130 And whereas preADAAA litigation saw cases being dismissed on disability status
grounds, post-ADAAA opinions suddenly put a spotlight on the
qualification element of a prima facie case.131 An empirical analysis
reviewing all reported federal district court summary judgment
decisions in ADA cases from 2010 to 2013 revealed that employers
responded to the ADAAA by “shifting their asserted grounds for
seeking summary judgement” to challenge the qualifications rather than disabled status of the litigant employee.132 Moreover,
this new “disqualification” strategy was effective: the employer summary judgment success rate rose from 47.9 percent pre-ADAAA
to 69.7 percent post-ADAAA.133
This suggests that while the ADAAA succeeded in making it
more difficult for an employer to challenge an ADA suit based on
the employee’s disability status, employers simply redirected their
attention to the employee’s qualifications.134 Scholars point out that
this new preferred defense strategy is particularly problematic in

Id.; see Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1127–28.
126 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, What You Should Know: EEOC
Regulations, Subregulatory Guidance, and Other Resource Documents (May 5,
2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/what-you-should-know-eeoc-regula
tions-subregulatory-guidance-and-other-resource [https://perma.cc/VRS3-LNVC].
127 See Blair, supra note 105, at 1362–63; Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1128.
128 Travis, supra note 97, at 1695.
129 See id. at 1693–94.
130 See id. at 1707.
131 See id. at 1710–11.
132 Id. at 1704–05.
133 See id. at 1705–06.
134 Travis, supra note 97, at 1695.
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that an employee’s qualified individual status is at least partially
dependent on the employer’s own interpretation; the two qualified
individual evidentiary sources mentioned in the ADA are the employer’s judgment and written job description, given nearly dispositive weight by many courts.135 As a result, employers are able to
appropriate control of the ADA’s qualified individual requirement
and enjoy judicial deference toward their own determination of
whether the opposing party is qualified.136 Employers can thusly
exploit the qualified inquiry far beyond its original “circumscribed
role of defining the boundary of an employer’s accommodation
mandate.”137 This new battle strategy gives rise to a another issue:
to what extent can employers utilize evidence of unfulfilled qualifications to thwart an employee’s prima facie case, when the deficiency
is discovered only after the alleged discrimination?
III.AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE OF AN ADA
PLAINTIFF’S LACK OF QUALIFICATION
A. After-Acquired Evidence in ADEA Cases: McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
The doctrine of after-acquired evidence appeared regularly
in employment discrimination litigation of the 1980s,138 as courts
came to accept employer arguments that a plaintiff could not legally
be a victim of discrimination when their late-discovered conduct
would have resulted in termination regardless.139 As used by courts,
the doctrine honed in on prior employee misconduct and acted as
a complete bar to liability.140 This made it a potent weapon for
employer-defendants: “it was a goldmine or a godsend. All you
have to do is take an employee and find out something that they
have done wrong, some misconduct that you never knew about
and, boom, there goes their civil rights claim.”141 However, some

See id. at 1710.
136 See id.
137 Id.
138 See Hart, supra note 12, at 405–06.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 406.
141 Id. (Audio script file: All Things Considered, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 23,
1995) (available in LexisNexis Library, Script File) (transcript of Michael Terry,
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courts declined to use after-acquired evidence as a complete bar to
liability, concerned that a plaintiff’s prior conduct could essentially
enable an employer to discriminate without punishment.142
The United States Supreme Court confronted this dispute
in 1995 with McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., an
employment discrimination suit filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).143 Plaintiff Christine
McKennon worked at Nashville Banner for thirty years before losing her job in a force reduction plan, which McKennon alleged
was actually discrimination based on her age.144 Banner deposed
McKennon in the course of the lawsuit and discovered she had
removed several confidential documents from the office during
her employment.145 Such misconduct violated McKennon’s terms
of employment and, had the company been aware of it, would
have resulted in her immediate discharge.146 At the pretrial motion stage, Banner conceded its discrimination against McKennon,
but pointed to the new, after-acquired evidence of her misconduct as a bar to liability.147 The trial court granted Banner’s
motion for summary judgment and denied all relief, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.148
The Supreme Court reversed and held that after-acquired
evidence of wrongdoing which would have resulted in discharge
did not completely bar a plaintiff-employee from obtaining relief
under the ADEA.149 The Court found that an employment action
violative of the ADEA (or assumed to be so) could not be disregarded or rendered irrelevant simply by late-discovered evidence
of an employee’s wrongdoing, even assuming the misconduct was
grave enough to have resulted in discharge.150 In its analysis, the
Court walked through the objectives of the ADEA as a workplace

attorney for Christine McKennon, relating a statement made by a management lawyer)).
142 See id. at 407.
143 See id.; McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 354 (1995).
144 McKennon, 513 U.S. at 354–55.
145 Id. at 355.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 356.
150 Id. at 356–57.

286 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:267
antidiscrimination statute, noting it reflected Title VII in both substance and purpose.151 That is, the McKennon Court emphasized
that the goal of these laws encompassed deterrence as well as
compensation: “Congress designed the remedial measures in these
statutes to serve as a ‘spur or catalyst’ to cause employers ‘to selfexamine ... and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last
vestiges’ of discrimination.”152 As such, the Court reasoned it would
contradict this scheme to allow after-acquired evidence of employee
wrongdoing to completely bar a claim alleging an employer’s violation of the ADEA.153
With regard to how the newly discovered misconduct may
nonetheless alter the available relief, the Court rejected the strict
“unclean hands” argument154 and recognized that an employee’s
ADEA suit served an important public purpose (here, vindicating the national policy against discrimination in employment).155
Thus the Court reasoned that the limits of remedial relief in
after-discovered evidence cases should not be categorical, but
should instead be dealt with on a case-by-case basis to adjust for
varying facts and equitable considerations.156 So, McKennon left
to the courts the job of working through “the duality between the
legitimate interests of the employer and the important claims of
the employee who invokes the national employment policy mandated by the Act.”157
McKennon demonstrates that after-acquired evidence of
employee transgressions cannot necessarily bar all relief, at least
in ADEA cases.158 But how does this approach apply to non-ADEA
antidiscrimination employment laws? A split in opinion currently
exists between federal circuit courts of appeals over whether afterdiscovered evidence of an employee’s lack of job qualification may

Id. at 357–58.
152 Id. at 358 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–
18 (1975)).
153 Id.
154 The McKennon Court describes the doctrine of unclean hands as “[e]quity’s
maxim that a suitor who engaged in his own reprehensible conduct in the
course of the transaction at issue must be denied equitable relief.” Id. at 360.
155 Id. at 358, 360.
156 Id. at 361.
157 Id.
158 Id.; see Hart, supra note 12, at 407.
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be used to entirely defeat a suit filed under the ADA on prima
facie grounds, or whether it may only limit available relief.159
B. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit found McKennon’s reasoning applicable to ADA claims in the 2005 case Rooney v. Koch Air, where it
stated that after-acquired evidence of an employee’s lack of qualification should merely limit potentially recoverable damages.160
Plaintiff Daniel Rooney worked as an Assistant Customer Assurance Manager for defendant Koch Air.161 Part of his position
required job-site visits and, after suffering back injuries, Rooney
refused to perform this duty despite being medically cleared to
do so; Rooney then rejected an alternative (lower-paid) position.162
During discovery, Koch Air learned Rooney had not possessed a
valid driver’s license during his employment, despite the company
requiring he have one (as his job involved driving company vehicles).163 At the pretrial motion stage, the district court granted
Koch Air’s motion for summary judgment, but specifically focused
on Rooney’s failure to satisfy the fourth element of the jurisdiction’s
ADA prima facie case, which required that similarly situated employees received more favorable treatment.164
The Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal, but by finding
Rooney failed to satisfy the disabled individual element of his prima
facie case.165 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit also ventured into
the qualification element of Rooney’s ADA claim.166 Despite noting Rooney failed the essential functions prong regardless due to
his inability to perform the job-site visits,167 the court went on to
explain that the after-acquired evidence of his failure to fulfill a
job-related requirement (in other words, his lack of a valid driver’s

Compare Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir.
2020), with Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005).
160 Rooney, 410 F.3d at 382.
161 Id. at 378–79.
162 Id. at 379–80.
163 Id. at 382.
164 Id. at 381.
165 Id. at 381–82.
166 Id. at 382.
167 Id.
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license) would not alone have barred all relief.168 The Seventh
Circuit explicitly found “no distinction ... between an age discrimination claim like the one in McKennon and an ADA claim,”
and therefore reasoned that a “late revelation” of a plaintiff’s
failure to fulfill job prerequisites would merely limit recoverable
damages.169
C. The Ninth Circuit
In a recent 2020 case, Anthony v. Trax International Corp.,
the Ninth Circuit disagreed, instead finding that after-acquired
evidence of an ADA plaintiff-employee’s lack of qualification meant
a failed prima facie case which could completely bar relief (by
permitting summary judgment for the employer-defendant).170
Plaintiff Sunny Anthony worked for defendant Trax as a Technical Writer, a position requiring a bachelor’s degree in English,
journalism, or a related field.171 Anthony suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder and consequently missed periods of
work under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA);172 she
was fired when her FMLA leave expired before she submitted a
release form medically clearing her for return to her position.173
Anthony filed suit under the ADA and alleged she was discriminatorily discharged, submitting evidence she would have been
eligible for rehire in alternative support positions.174 During
litigation, Trax discovered that Anthony lacked the bachelor’s
degree required for the Technical Writer position, despite her
employment application representing otherwise.175 The district
court granted Trax’s motion for summary judgment in light of
this after-acquired evidence.176
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the EEOC filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of Anthony, supporting the Seventh Circuit’s
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170 Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1134 (9th Cir. 2020).
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reading of McKennon as meaning after-acquired evidence of an
employee’s lack of qualification could “at most, ... limit the applicable relief,” instead of completely negating an employer’s potential liability for disability discrimination.177 The EEOC cited
both McKennon and Rooney for support, emphasizing their compatibility with the underlying enforcement objectives of the ADA—
deterrence and compensation.178 As amicus, the EEOC made an
interesting argument: the two-step qualification standard promulgated in its own regulation (additionally requiring a plaintiff to satisfy the job-related requirements of the position) should apply only
when the particular qualifications are relevant to the employer’s
challenged decision-making.179 Otherwise, the EEOC argued, the
prima facie requirements in after-acquired evidence cases like Anthony should revert to the ADA’s essential functions standard.180
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit affirmed using the EEOC’s
standard two-step inquiry, finding Anthony was not qualified due
to her failure to satisfy the position’s requirement of a bachelor’s
degree.181 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that this
two-step qualified individual test be limited to facts known by the
employer at the time of the employment decision, instead reasoning that an employee’s objective possession of the requisite qualification is the only relevant fact at that time.182 According to
the court, an employer’s subjective knowledge of such qualification (or lack thereof) at the time of the employment decision has
“no bearing” on the employee’s status as a qualified individual
under the ADA.183 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent clearly embraced the two-step inquiry as the ADA qualification standard, and pointedly rejected the EEOC’s amicus argument:
“[T]o the extent the EEOC wants us to disregard the prerequisites
step of its two-step inquiry ... , it could reconsider its own implementing regulations.”184 And, unlike the Seventh Circuit in

Brief of the EEOC, supra note 23, at 16.
Id. at 17–18.
179 Id. at 23.
180 The EEOC argued Anthony’s bachelor’s degree (or lack thereof) was not
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181 See Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1128.
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Rooney, the Ninth Circuit in Anthony expressly declined to apply
McKennon’s reasoning to ADA cases.185 Instead, Anthony found
that the McDonnell Douglas framework enabled summary judgment for the defendant, even when the plaintiff’s failure to fulfill
job prerequisites was not discovered until after the allegedly discriminatory employment action.186
IV.A MIDDLE GROUND FOR AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE AND ADA
QUALIFICATION: REVERT TO ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
A. The EEOC Relevance Trigger
The EEOC as amicus in Anthony argued its own two-step
qualification standard additionally requiring a plaintiff to satisfy
the job-related prerequisites of the position should be abandoned
in favor of the ADA’s essential functions standard in instances
where the particular job requirements are not relevant to the
employer’s allegedly discriminatory action.187 Thus, the EEOC’s
proposed essential functions reversion is triggered by an early
relevance determination.188 When faced with an ADA plaintiff’s
after-discovered failure to fulfill job prerequisites, this approach
obliges the court to additionally determine, at the prima facie
stage, whether the requirements at issue were relevant to the
challenged employment action.189 Only if the court finds relevance will the qualified individual inquiry revert to the less
stringent essential functions test; if no such relevance is found,
the prima facie case fails without essential functions coming into
the equation.190
The EEOC’s amicus brief and proposal encapsulate the key
truth illuminated by these after-acquired evidence cases: the foundational “qualified individual” standard set forth in the ADA should
not be supplanted by the two-step test of 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(m) in all
cases.191 However, the EEOC’s proposed method is imperfect: by
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basing reversion to the ADA on the nature of the alleged discrimination (in other words, on the extent to which the job-related
requirements are relevant), it usurps the McDonnell Douglas
process and sets the stage for prima facie overload.192
The EEOC argues reversion to the essential standard should
occur only when the job-related requirements at issue are not
relevant to the challenged decision making.193 However, it is not
entirely clear where the burden of proving this new relevancy requirement would lie.194 That is, in order to even trigger the reversion, a plaintiff (already under attack by after-acquired evidence
and working to establish other prima facie elements) may come
under pressure to additionally demonstrate that the job-related
requirements they lack are not relevant to the employment action they challenge.195 And even if this new relevancy requirement were to technically fall outside their designated prima facie
burden, a plaintiff may nonetheless obliquely assume it amidst
desire and effort to avoid dismissal.196
Moreover, the essential functions reversion should not depend on the nature of the employment action being challenged.197
Hearkening back to the McDonnell Douglas framework as used
in ADA cases, a plaintiff must establish their “qualified individual”
status as a prima facie matter, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged discriminatory employment action.198 It
is the employer who carries the burden at the next stage to
produce rebuttal evidence that the employment action was not
unlawful discrimination.199 Thus, the fact of qualification itself is a
prima facie question (although the proper standard for cases involving after-acquired evidence obviously remains disputed);200
the relevance of the job qualification, on the other hand, properly
belongs later in litigation.201

See infra Section IV.B.
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So, if relevance is not a suitable trigger,202 this begs the
question: exactly when and how should the job-related requirements standard added by the EEOC regulation give way to the
essential functions standard required by ADA itself?
B. An Alternative: The “Sole Glitch” Trigger
This Note proposes an alternative to the EEOC’s relevance
method: the qualified individual inquiry should revert to the ADA’s
essential functions standard when the evidence of a plaintiff’s unfulfilled job-related requirements (1) is discovered only after the
alleged discriminatory employment action, and (2) constitutes the
sole flaw in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.203 Because the EEOC
is authorized to promulgate regulations with legislative force,204
departure from the two-prong test of 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(m) requires
corrective action by either Congress205 or the EEOC itself.206 As the
Ninth Circuit noted, such action is due here; otherwise, plaintiffs
and courts alike will remain powerless against the job-related
requirements prong.207 However, in the absence of legislative intervention, courts would be well advised to follow the scheme pitched
by the EEOC in their Ninth Circuit amicus brief; this approach at
least lessens the potency of the job-related requirements standard by partially inhibiting its ability to necessitate dismissal.208
Consider this Note’s proposed method (hereinafter referred
to as the sole glitch approach) in action. At the pretrial motion
stage, a defendant uses after-acquired evidence to attack the qualified individual element of an employee’s prima facie ADA case,
specifically alleging the plaintiff failed to satisfy the job-related

See supra Section IV.A.
203 See infra Section IV.B.
204 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
205 Congress is able to overturn a rule issued by a federal agency, including one that has already taken effect, under the Congressional Review Act of
1996. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(f). Another alternative would be an amending enactment
similar to the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. See generally Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–121113).
206 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
208 See Brief of the EEOC, supra note 23, at 16.
202



2021]

TO BAR OR NOT TO BAR

293

requirements of the position as required by the EEOC’s 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(m). Instead of dismissing or engaging in a premature relevance inquiry, the court would simply consider whether all other
(jurisdiction-dependent) prima facie requirements have been met.
If the court finds that the qualified individual element is the only
unsatisfied prima facie factor (as a result of the after-acquired
evidence attack), then the two-step test incorporating job-related
requirements would yield to the singular essential functions inquiry.209 At this point, a plaintiff could still fail to establish a
prima facie case through the qualified individual element if they
are unable to satisfy the ADA’s threshold essential functions
standard.210 However, the after-acquired evidence of unfulfilled
job prerequisites would not function alone to completely bar an
ADA plaintiff’s suit.211
Under the sole glitch approach, an employee cannot throw
off their prima facie burden altogether; as an ADA plaintiff, they
will still be required to establish that they qualify as disabled under
the statute and that they suffered employment discrimination on
that basis.212 Moreover, the job-related requirements element added
by the EEOC’s expanded definition of qualified individual would
give way to the less stringent definition set forth in the ADA in
only narrow circumstances. Because the sole glitch method triggers reversion to the ADA standard exclusively in situations where
the sole prima facie flaw exists due to after-acquired evidence
specifically assailing the job prerequisites prong of the qualified
individual element, it is sufficiently limited in scope as to not
otherwise inhibit the effectiveness or judicial use of the test. For
example, the sole glitch trigger could have potentially operated
in Anthony to allow the suit to continue without forcing the
Ninth Circuit to choose between either dismissal or completely
overruling its precedent following the EEOC two-step qualified
individual standard.213

See supra text accompanying notes 124–25.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 119–23.
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C. The Value of Separating Relevance from Reversion
The sole glitch method is similar to the EEOC amicus approach in that it proposes reversion to the essential functions test,
but with a very different choice of trigger.214 Instead of reverting to
the statutory test when after-acquired evidence causes the sole
prima facie glitch, the EEOC amicus approach demands relevance
be found between the job-related requirements and the alleged
discrimination.215 As described above in Section IV.A, this subverts the McDonnell Douglas process and sets the stage for prima
facie overload on the plaintiff.216
In contrast, the sole glitch method is triggered by a defendant’s weaponization of after-acquired evidence rather than an
extra relevance inquiry. It consequently retains the McDonnell
Douglas framework while nonetheless staying in line with the
EEOC amicus rationale.217 The reasoning behind the EEOC amicus approach is similar to that of the Seventh Circuit in Rooney:
a plaintiff who failed to satisfy job-related requirements should
not be categorically barred from bringing suit under the ADA.218 As
the EEOC puts it, dismissing a plaintiff’s case based on unfulfilled
job requirements discovered only after the alleged discrimination
would effectively “do an end-run around McKennon and lead to
underenforcement of the law.”219 Recall, the Court in McKennon
reasoned it would run directly contrary to the goal of employment
discrimination legislation to allow after-acquired evidence of an
employee’s shortcomings to completely bar their claim.220 And
although McKennon dealt with suits arising under the ADEA, the
propriety (and necessity) of extending its rationale to ADA cases is
particularly clear given the statutes’ affinity: both were modeled
after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,221 contemplate deterrence

Brief of the EEOC, supra note 23, at 22.
See supra Section IV.A.
216 See supra Section IV.A.
217 See supra Sections IV.A, B.
218 See Brief of the EEOC, supra note 23, at 27; Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC,
410 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005).
219 Brief of the EEOC, supra note 23, at 27.
220 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975)); see also supra
notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
221 See Ireland & Bales, supra note 10, at 188; McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357–58.
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as well as compensation,222 and enable private lawsuits to serve
the public purpose of vindicating national policy against discrimination in the workplace.223
The sole glitch approach thus assuages the rationale of
the EEOC method without forcing the court to assess or the parties
to prove the relationship between the challenged employment action and unsatisfied job-related requirements as a prima facie
matter.224 Instead of demanding a premature relevance determination (whereby pressuring the plaintiff to prove irrelevance in an
effort to trigger the essential function reversion and resist dismissal),225 the sole glitch alternative simply relies on the McDonnell
Douglas framework.226 The plaintiff must still plead a complete
prima facie ADA case despite the more generous essential functions
standard, and the employer remains burdened with the rebuttal
justification of its own employment decision,227 including ample
opportunity to use the relevance of unsatisfied job-related requirements as an argument.228 In this regard, the Ninth Circuit in
Anthony was correct: the employer’s awareness of the plaintiffemployee’s unfulfilled job prerequisites at the time of the challenged
employment action, however relevant it might be, does not belong
in the prima facie stage.229

See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text; Catherine Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Civil Rights without Remedies: Vicarious Liability under Title VII,
Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 756 (1999) (“Indeed,
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court made it clear in McKennon: employment discrimination legislation must not be categorically subdued
by after-acquired evidence of a plaintiff’s failures as an employee.230
Otherwise, credible allegations of workplace discrimination may
go unaddressed.231 Failure to extend this reasoning to suits filed
under the ADA undermines the legislation, subverts its goals,
and enables underenforcement.232 The EEOC itself recognizes as
much and recommends departure from its two-part test in favor
of the ADA’s basic essential functions standard in limited circumstances.233 Emphasizing the analogous policy goals of the
ADA and ADEA, the EEOC champions McKennon’s rationale to
prevent dismissal where after-acquired evidence of a plaintiff’s
unfulfilled job prerequisites operates as a technicality, irrelevant to the challenged employment action.234 However, the
strength of the EEOC rationale is undermined by the likelihood
that the burden of this new preliminary relevance inquiry will
either fall upon or be taken up by plaintiffs.235 Moreover, under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as applied to
ADA cases, the relevance of the plaintiff’s qualifications (or lack
thereof) to the challenged employment decision properly belongs
later in litigation.236
Instead of relevance, the trigger for abandoning the twopart test should hinge on the after-acquired evidence attack itself.237
The “sole glitch” approach proposes that the qualified individual
inquiry revert to the ADA’s singular essential functions standard when the evidence of unfulfilled job-related requirements is
both discovered after the alleged discriminatory employment action,
and constitutes the sole flaw in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.238

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 356 (1995).
See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text.
233 See Brief of the EEOC, supra note 23, at 27.
234 See id. at 27.
235 See supra Sections IV.A, C.
236 See supra Sections IV.A, C.
237 See supra Section IV.B.
238 See supra Section IV.B.
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The sole glitch trigger vindicates the EEOC rationale but avoids
compelling a plaintiff to establish the relevancy between the challenged employment action and unsatisfied job prerequisites,
instead displacing that pressure onto the McDonnell Douglas
framework.239 Legislative allowance for this ADA reversion needs to
be made by Congress or the EEOC; otherwise, courts must make
what headway they can via the EEOC-proposed method.240
Congress set a lofty, but firm goal with the ADA: “to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities ....”241 Despite
the Supreme Court in McKennon articulating the need to protect
employment discrimination lawsuits from after-acquired evidence attacks,242 suits filed under the ADA remain assailable.243
More than that, they are under assault.244 Stubborn perpetuation of the EEOC’s job-related prerequisite expansion currently
enables dismissal of potentially otherwise credible ADA claims.245
And, while the relevancy relationship between the job-related
perquisites and the alleged discrimination is no doubt important, the extent to which the former vindicates the latter is a
determination that belongs later in litigation.246 Congress, the
EEOC, and courts must recognize the weaponization of afteracquired evidence in the context of the ADA’s qualified individual
requirement and be willing to raise the shield of McKennon to
prevent such post hoc investigations from preliminarily eviscerating lawsuits—even if that means occasionally reverting back
to basics (that is, the essential functions standard).247 Equity requires corrective action as to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) to enable and
encourage that reversion.


See supra Section IV.B.
240 See supra Section IV.B.
241 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (West 2009).
242 Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2020).
243 See, e.g., id.
244 Id.; see supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
245 See Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1128.
246 See supra Section IV.C.
247 See supra text accompanying notes 179–80.
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